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John E. Tilton, currently a Research Scholar at IIASA, is on leave from the 
Pennsylvania State University, where he is a Professor of Mineral Econom- 
ics. His work at IlASA mainly focuses on the economics of mineral trade 
and markets. 
Fear that the world may soon deplete its available resources of 
copper, nickel, and other mineral commodities arises from time to time. 
The most recent wave of concern appeared in the early 1970s as a result 
of rather severe mineral shortages and other developments at  that time. 
Over the intervening years, however, research conducted a t  IIASA and 
elsewhere has concluded that mineral depletion is not a pressing global 
problem for at least the foreseeable future--the rest of t h s  century and 
well into the next. While the depletion of hlgh grade mines may require 
the use of poorer quality and hlgher cost deposits, new technology tends 
to offset the adverse effects of depletion by reducing the costs of explora- 
tion, mining and processing, and by increasing the range of substitute 
materials. 
This research, coupled with falling mineral prices and depressed 
market conditions in recent years, has led some to conclude that non-fuel 
minerals pose little or no threat to the future welfare of mankind. Oth- 
ers, however, are more circumspect, aware that adequate mineral 
resources alone are not enough. Serious shortages can still occur, and 
last for several years, if investment in new mines and processing facilities 
is insufficient, if the demand for minerals surges in response to booms in 
the business cycle, or if mineral trade is interrupted by embargoes, civil 
disruptions, and other political events: In addition, new sources of 
mineral supplies, such as seabed mining, and the instability of mineral 
markets caused by the business cycle can seriously threaten families, 
communities, and even countries that depend on mining and mineral pro- 
cessing for income and employment. It was concerns such as these that 
led IIASA to initiate, in July 1982, a research effort on Mineral Trade and 
Markets, as a project of the Patterns of Economic Structural Change and 
Industrial Adjustment Program. 
This paper, in its present form was originally prepared under con- 
tract with the United Kations and was presented at the expert group 
meeting on the Impact of SeaSed Mlnerals on the Yorld Economy which 
was organized by the United Natlons Department of International 
Economic and Social Affairs, Ocean Economics and Technology Branch 
and convened at  the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 20 Janu- 
ary 1983. 
John E. Tilton 
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and Markets Project 
ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the future effects of seabed mining on the 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel industries, and the implications 
for producing and consuming states. The analysis is qualitative, or con- 
ceptual, in nature. While no effort is made to actually measure or quan- 
tify the impacts of seabed mining, important variables that one would 
have to consider in making such measurements are identified. 
While deep-sea mining holds the promise of potentially less expensive 
sources of minerals, it also raises the specter of dislocation and decline 
for land-based producers, many of whom are located in the developing 
countries. There is widespread concern that unless seabed mining is 
regulated, most of the benefits flowing from this "common heritage of 
mankind" will go to the developed countries that have both the technol- 
ogy to exploit these minerals and the capacity to consume the output. 
Despite the study's fairly narrow scope, two general conclusions 
emerge. First, measuring the future impacts of seabed mining is an 
extremely complicated and difficult endeavor. There is much disagree- 
ment about the relative costs of seabed and land-based production.How 
scientific breakthroughs and other technological developments will alter 
future costs is simply unknown,and to some extent unknowable. More- 
over, relative costs alone will not be the only determinant of the future 
level of seabed mining. Some countries may support such production to 
lessen their dependence on foreign producers. Distressed land-based pro- 
ducers may receive assistance from their own governments and protec- 
tion in the form of constraints on seabed production, negotiated through 
international agreements. Thus production may be influenced as much 
by political decisions as by economic considerations. Even if the future 
level of seabed mining could be ascertained, its impact would be difficult 
to assess ex a n t e ,  Such assessments require knowledge of long-run sup- 
ply and demand curves that goes beyond observed historical price and 
output equilibria. Nor is it clear how these curves will shift over time in 
response to resource depletion, technological progress, the introduction 
of new materials, changes in mineral policies, and other factors. 
Second, the potential impacts of seabed mining appear to vary and 
to be less bounded than is often presumed. For example, the first com- 
mercial mining of seabed nodules is widely anticipated during the 1990s 
and several consortia are expected to be in operation by the end of the 
century. Yet the necessary technology, particularly on the scale 
required, has not yet been proven. Further, it is not clear whether the 
requisite policies to protect investments are in place. These uncertain- 
ties raise the possibility that seabed mining could suffer a fate similar to 
that of oil shale,where for years commercial production appeared 
imminent but the goal remains elusive. Moreover,the impacts of seabed 
mining are not fully appreciated as is evident by the argument that 
seabed mining could not force existing land-based mines to close. The 
rationale for this position overlooks the potential influence of new tech- 
nology on relative costs of both seabed and land-based mining and 
ignores the coproduct nature of seabed operations and the substantial 
effect of. even limited production on the cobalt market and perhaps on 
the manganese market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago seabed nodules were a scientific curiosity of little 
public interest. Today, thanks to a number of technological advances, 
they represent a major potential source of cobalt, copper, manganese, 
and nickel, and several consortia of private firms and public enterprises 
are seriously contemplating their commercial exploitation. 
Although actual production is still a number of years off, a lively 
debate has already arisen over appropriate measures to assure the 
timely and efficient development of seabed minerals, to minimize the 
adverse effects on land-based mineral producers, and to promote a wide 
and equitable distribution of the resulting benefits. While deep sea min- 
ing offers the promise of a major new and potentially less expensive 
source of minerals, it also raises the specter of dislocation and decline for 
land-based producers, many of which are developing countries. In addi- 
tion, there is widespread concern that, unless seabed mining is closely 
regulated, most of the benefits flowing from this "common heritage of 
mankind" will go to the developed industrialized countries. They possess 
the necessary technology to exploit seabed minerals, and with their huge 
appetite for all raw materials have the capacity to consume the resulting 
output. 
This paper considers the future effects of seabed mining on the 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel industries, and the implications 
for producing and consuming states. The analysis is qualitative, or con- 
ceptual, in nature. While no effort is made to actually measure or quan- 
tify the impacts of seabed mining, important variables that one would 
have to consider in mak~ng such measurements are identified. The focus 
is on three concerns, each of which encompasses a set of questions about 
the future consequences of seabed mining. The first is the effect on 
future production costs. The depletion of higher grade, more readily 
accessible, and easier-to-process deposits exerts, over time, upward pres- 
sure on the costs of producing minerals. In the past, this upward pres- 
sure has been largely or completely offset by the cost reducing effects of 
new technology (Barnett and Morse, 1963; Barnett, 1979). On a number of 
occasions, technology has opened up entirely new sources of supply, as 
the successful extraction of copper from porphyry deposits and iron from 
taconite so clearly illustrates. Such developments help hold at bay the 
long-run threat of resource exhaustion. 
Do seabed nodules offer a similar opportunity? Can they keep the 
costs and prices of cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel from rising 
over the long run as fast as they otherwise would? Are they potentially a 
lower cost source of supply than present land-based deposits? These 
questions are important for producers as well as consumers. Persistent 
price increases over the long run force consumers to search for alterna- 
tive materials, and so adversely affect the markets of producers. 
The second effect of interest concerns the location of future mining 
activity. Will seabed operations cause land-based production to decline? 
In particular, will they reduce output in the developing countries, and 
thus the contribution of mining to the much needed economic growth of 
these states? How will seabed mining ultimately affect the diversity of 
supply sources? Will it increase or decrease the vulnerability of consum- 
ing countries to supply interruptions? Will producing firms, governments, 
and international bodies find it easier or more difficult to exercise mono- 
poly power, to form producer cartels, or in other ways to control mineral 
markets? 
The third concern involves the welfare implications of seabed mining 
for consuming and producing countries. In particular, how will the bene- 
fits and costs be distributed? Will most of the benefits go to the 
developed countries? Will land-based producing countries, particularly 
those that are developing, suffer severely? Will efforts to help the land- 
based producers assist the developed countries more than the developing 
countries? 
In examining these issues, one needs to define an appropriate time 
period and a base case whch shows how production costs, the location of 
mining, and the distribution of benefits would evolve over the period of 
interest in the absence of seabed mining. Since commercial production 
of seabed nodules may not begin before the mid 1990s, the focus here is 
on the 25 year period from 1995 through 2020. 
Recent trends in the cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel markets 
are assessed in the next section, along with their implications for the evo- 
lution of these markets over the 1995-2020 period. This sets the stage for 
the following section to consider conceptually the consequences of seabed 
mining. The final section then describes the research needed if the anti- 
cipated consequences are eventually to be measured and their impacts 
fully assessed. 
mCENT TRENDS 
This section investigates recent trends in the prices and production 
costs, the location of mining activity, and the distribution of the benefits 
from trade in the principal mineral commodities contained in seabed 
nodules. 
Prices and Production Costs 
Table 1 indicates the average annual real prices in 1978 dollars for 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel over the 25 year period 1954-79 in 
the United States. Except for manganese, where all prices are nego- 
tiated, the prices shown are producer prices, as changes in these prices 
parallel movements in long-run costs more closely than prices 
determined on the London Metal Exchange, COMEX, or other competitive 
markets. 
The most striking surge in price reported in Table 1 occurs for cobalt 
in 19'78-79, and reflects the disruption of supplies from Zaire that 
occurred in 19'78 when rebels based in Angola invaded the Shaba Province 
and overran the country's principal mining areas. The expansion of out- 
put elsewhere and the substitution of alternative materials stimulated by 
the unusually high price of cobalt, coupled with the resumption of sup- 
plies from Zaire and generally depressed market conditions, have since 
caused the real price of cobalt to drop sharply. Aside from this rather 
dramatic perturbation, the price of cobalt fell and then rose modestly 
over the period examined. 
Copper prices display no pronounced trend, but rather appear to 
move up and down in response to short-run market conditions. Man- 
ganese shows a secular decline in prices through the early 19'70s that 
recent years have only partially reversed. In contrast, nickel has enjoyed 
a modest but fairly persistent increase in price. 
While the figures of Table 1 more or less reflect changes over time in 
the prices that consumers have had to pay,1 the extent to whch they 
indicate trends in the long-run costs of marginal producers is somewhat 
less certain. It is true that in competitive industries where no serious 
'AS the cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel markets in the United States are closely tied 
to those abroad, U.S. prices tend to parallel the prices elsewhere. Still, there are at times 
differences between the prices paid by consumers in the United States and other countries. 
Moreover, the figures shown in Table 1 may not precisely reflect the average prices actually 
paid by U.S. consumers for a number of reasons. For example, some cobalt, copper, and 
nickel is purchased from COMEX, from metal dealers or other sources that do not adhere to 
the producer price. Ln addition, even the producers themselves at times offer open or secret 
discounts from their quoted price. 
Tab le  1. Average Annual Rea l  P r i c e s  f o r  Coba l t ,  Copper, Manganese, and Nicke l  
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  1954-79. 
P r i c e s  i n  (1978) D o l l a r s  
Cobal t  Copper Manganese Nicke l  
( p e r  pound) ( p e r  pound) ( p e r  long-ton u n i t )  ( p e r  pound) 
Sources:  U.S. Bureau of Mines, C o b a l t  (1980); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Copper 
(1980); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Manganese (1980); U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
Nickel  (1980); U.S. Bureau o f  Mines, Cobalt-1977 (1977); U.S. Bureau 
of Mines, Copper-1977 (1977); U.S. Bureau o f  Mines, Manganese-1977 
(1977); U.S. Bureau of  Mines, Nickel-1977 (1977). 
obstacles prevent firms from entering or leaving, one would expect prices 
to fluctuate around long-term costs, where the latter include an appropri- 
ate rate of return on equity capital. If prices were below such costs, 
firms would leave the industry and capacity would decline. If prices were 
above costs, investors would divert more of their available funds into the 
industry, and expand capacity. Eventually such behavior should push 
prices back toward costs. Herfindahl (1959) in h s  well-known study of 
the copper industry employed this rationale to justify the use of prices to 
estimate long-run trends in the cost of producing copper. 
In monopolistic or oligopolistic industries, prices may be maintained 
above production costs over the long term, allowing firms to earn excess 
profits. Still, there are reasons to believe such firms will adjust their 
prices in response to changes in long-run costs. Thus, changes in price 
may reflect shifts in costs, even though price levels may be maintained 
above costs. 
Despite such considerations, the price trends shown in Table 1 may 
not accurately parallel long-run cost trends. The mining and processing 
of metals are energy and capital intensive. Consequently, the sharp rise 
in the prices of energy, plants, and equipment during the 1970s exerted 
considerable upward pressure on production costs. Stricter regulations 
in the developed countries governing pollution control along with higher 
interest rates worldwide accentuated t h s  pressure. 
While Table 1 shows the prices for all four metals examined tended to 
rise modestly during the 1970s, for two reasons producers have probably 
not yet been able to pass on in the form of hgher prices the full increase 
in long-run production costs. First, since the worldwide boom of 1973-74, 
the economies of the major industrialized countries have been relatively 
depressed, due largely to high interest rates and other macro-economic 
policies pursued to curb inflation and to maintain balance of payments. 
Since metals are largely consumed in the industrialized countries, and in 
particular in those economic sectors--capital equipment, construction, 
transportation, and consumer durables--whose output is highly sensitive 
to overall fluctuations in the business cycle, the demand for most metals 
has suffered for nearly a decade. It is difficult for producers to raise 
prices when markets are depressed. 
Second, the cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel industries have 
all experienced considerable structural change over the last several 
decades. The host governments of some producing countries have 
acquired control over significant production capacity from multinational 
mining corporations. For this and other reasons, these industries have 
grown more competitive. Under such conditions, prices can decline rela- 
tive to long-run cost for prolonged periods. 
Thus, while new technology could conceivably have offset the upward 
pressure on production costs resulting from higher energy, capital, and 
pollution control costs and in the process prevented metal prices from 
rising sharply during the 1970s, a more likely explanation of the modest 
price increases is that structural adjustment and market conditions have 
simply not yet permitted producers to pass on fully their increased costs 
to consumers. This explanation is consistent with the findlngs of available 
feasibility studies for major new mineral projects, whch indicate that 
considerably h~gher  metal prices are needed to make the expected 
returns attractive to investors. In copper, for example, analyses of the 
Cerro Colorado deposit in Panama and other major undeveloped porphyry 
bodies indicate that a price of between 1.50 and 2.00 dollars per pound of 
copper is needed to justify their development. If such new sources of 
supply will eventually have to be developed to satisfy future demand, as is 
widely assumed, this implies that the price of copper will have to rise 
appreciably in real terms to cover the upward shift in costs over the last 
decade. 
hcation of Mining 
Mine production of cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel in the 
major producing countries and groups of countries is shown in Tables 2a- 
d for the years 1950 and 1980, along with the distribution of reserves in 
the latter year. These tables reveal several interesting aspects of the 
shift in mining activity over the last three decades. 
First, despite the widespread belief that the developed industrialized 
countries are becoming increasingly dependent on the developing coun- 
tries for essential mineral commodities, the share of world output coming 
from the developing countries has not appreciably increased for most of 
the metals contained in seabed nodules. The notable exception is nickel, 
where the rise of Cuba, Indonesia, and the Philippines as producers and 
the expansion of output in New Caledonia have helped the developing 
countries capture 34% of the market compared to a modest 3% in 1950. 
While the share of the developed market economy countries has fallen 
from 77% to 44%, they still produce together more nickel than either of 
the other groups. With cobalt and manganese, the developing countries 
have actually seen their share of world output decline over the last thirty 
Table 2a. Cobalt  Mine Product ion and Reserves by Country, 1950 and 1980. 
Mine Production Reserves 
Thousands Thousands Thousands 
of Tons, of Tons, of Tons, 
Percent Cobalt  Percen t  Cobal t Cobalt  . Percent  
Content Content contentb  
Developing Count r i es  6.2 
Morocco .4 
Phi l i p p i n e s  a 
Zaire  5.1 
Zambia . 7  
Others a 
Developed F a r k e t  
Economy Countr ies  1 .O 
A u s t r a l i a  a 
Canada . 3  
Finland a 
Others . 7  
S o c i a l i s t  Countr ies  a 
Tota l  
a Notes: Product ion was under .25 tons.  
' ~ e s e r v e  f i g u r e s  were conver ted from pounds t o  m e t r i c  tons  and 
then  rounded t o  the  n e a r e s t  f i v e  thousand tons.  
Sources: Char les  River Assoc ia tes  (1969), Table 2-1; U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
Mineral  Commodity Summaries (1982), p.  37;  and U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
Cobalt  (1980), Table 5. 
Table  2b. Copper Mine Produc t ion  and Reserves by Country,  1950 and 1980.  
Mine Product ion Reserves 
Thousands Thousands M i l  l i o n s  
Tons , Percen t  o f  Tons, Copper Copper * Percen t  Percent Copper 
Content  c o n t e n t  c o n t e n t  
Developing Countr ies  
Ch i l e  
Pe ru  
P h i l i p p i n e s  
Z a i r e  
Zamb i a  
Others  
Developed Market 
Economy Coun t r i e s  
A u s t r a l i a  
Canada 
South A f r i c a  
United S ta te s '  
Others  
S o c i a l i s t  Coun t r i e s  
Po land 
USSR 
Other s  
To ta l  
Note: a ~ e s e r v e s  f o r  u n i d e n t i f i e d  n o n s o c i a l i s  t c o u n t r i e s  were a l l o c a t e d  
t o  o t h e r  developing c o u n t r i e s  and o t h e r  developed market  economy 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p roduc t ion  of t h e s e  two 
groups of c o u n t r i e s  i n  1980. 
Sources:  M e t a l l g e s e l l s c h a f t  (1958),  pp. 13-14; M e t a l l g e s e l l s c h a f t  (1981),  
pp. 29-30; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral  Commodity Summaries 
(1982), p. 41. 
Table 212. Manganese Mine Production and Reserves by Country, 1950 and 1980. 
Mine Production Reserves 
Thousands Thousands Millions 
of Tons, of Tons, Percent Actual Actual Percent Of percent Actual 
Weight Weight weightC 
Developing Countries 
Brazil 
Gabon 
India 
0 thers 
Developed Market 
Economy Countries 
Australia 
South Africa 
Others 
Socialist Countries 
China 
USSR 
Others 
Total 
Notes: %igures for 1950 exclude production in the socialist countries of Asia. 
b~roduction shown for others under developing countries for 1980 includes 
minor mounts of production from other developed countries. 
C~eserve figures were converted from short to metric tons and then rounded 
to the nearest five million tons. 
d~eserves shown for others under developing countries may include minor 
amounts of reserves located in other developed countries. 
Sources: UNCTAD, considerations of International Measures on Management (1977), 
Table Ib; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries (1982). 
Table 2d. Nickel Mine Production and Reserves by Country, 1950 and 1980. 
Mine Production Reserves 
Thousands Thousands Mi l l ions  
of Tons, Percent  of Tons, Nickel Percent Nickel Nickel Percent  
Content Content Content 
Developing Countr ies  
Cuba 
Indonesia 
New Caledonia 
Phi l ipp ines  
Others 
Developed Market 
Economy Countr ies  
Aus t ra l i a  
Canada 
South Afr ica  
Others 
S o c i a l i s t  Countr ies  
USSR 
Others 
Total  
Sources: Me ta l l ge se l l s cha f t  (1958), p. 31; Me ta l l ge se l l s cha f t  (1981), p. 55; and 
U.N. Department of Technical  Co-operation f o r  Development (1980), Table 3. 
years, though as a group they still account for nearly three-fourths of 
world cobalt production. 
Second, the developed countries have maintained and in some cases 
increased their share of world mine output, not because the United 
States and other major industrialized countries have expanded their 
domestic production, but rather because Australia, Canada, and South 
Africa have become increasingly important mineral exporters. This sug- 
gests that the developed industrialized countries are relying more on 
imports for their mineral needs, even though their dependence on 
imports from developing countries have remained stable or even 
declined. 
Third, in 1950 Zaire was the principal producer of cobalt, the United 
States of copper, the Soviet Union of manganese, and Canada of nickel. 
Over the intervening years, the market shares of all of these dominant 
producers have fallen greatly. The most striking example is the drop in 
Canadian nickel output from 75% to 26% of the world total. Despite these 
declines, 'the major producers of thirty years ago are still major produc- 
ers today. In contrast, even more dramatic shifts in comparative advan- 
tage are found in the location of mining for other mineral commodities. 
In bauxite, for example, the major producer in 1950, Surinam, saw its out- 
put over the years surpassed first by Jamaica, and then by Australia and 
Guinea. 
Fourth, over the last several decades the ranks of important produc- 
ing countries have grown. Australia, Finland, and the Phlippines have 
become significant producers of cobalt; Australia, Peru, the Philippines, 
Poland, and South Africa of copper; Australia and Gabon of manganese, 
and Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Africa of nickel. 
The entry of new countries coupled with the decline of the major 
traditional producers has reduced the level of country concentration. 
This, along with a parallel decline in concentration a t  the firm or enter- 
prise level, has strengthened competition, and made i t  even more diffi- 
cult in the cobalt and nickel industries for the dominant producers to  
control the market price and to earn excess profits over a prolonged 
period of time. These trends complicate the formation and maintenance 
of producer cartels, and hence reduce the likelihood of such collusive 
efforts among producers. They also enhance the security of supply of the 
major consuming countries, for now a n  interruption in output from any 
particular producing country can more easily be made up by other sup- 
pliers. 
While the  sh f t s  described in the location of mining over the last 
thirty years are of some intrinsic interest, we have reviewed them here in 
the hope of gaining some insights into the evolution of mining activity in 
the future. This raises the question, to  what extent are past trends likely 
to  continue? 
Although there is no way of knowing for certain the answer to this 
question, where the shifts in mining reported in Tables 2a-d have 
occurred in a continuous and persistent manner over time, we have more 
confidence in projecting them into the future. For instance, the share of 
world nickel production coming from the developed countries fell from 
77% to  62% from 1850 to  1960, then to  52% by 1970, and finally to 44% by 
1980, while the share of the  developing countries consistently rose over 
this period. On the other hand, a persistent long-run secular trend is less 
clear for copper. The developing countries saw their share of this market 
rise modestly from 42% to 44% between 1950 and 1960, then decline to 
38% in 1970, before returning to 44% in 1980. Similarly, the share of man- 
ganese market supplied by the developing countries climbed from 33% to 
nearly 40% during the 1950s, where it remained during the 1960s, before 
dropping to 26% during the 1970s. Had one projected in 1970 the develop- 
ing countries' share of the manganese market in 1980 on the basis of past 
upward trends, the result would have seriously overestimated the actual 
figure . 
Even where the trends have been consistent over the last t h r ty  
years, as in nickel, projections based on these trends implicitly assume 
that the important determinants of comparative advantage will continue 
to change and hence shape the shifts in the location of mining activity in 
the future as they have in the past. This is a strong assumption that few 
who ponder it seriously are comfortable making. The possibility of major 
structural change is always present. During the 1970s, for example, the 
sharp rise in energy prices is known to have adversely affected the pro- 
duction of nickel from laterite ores. As the shift in nickel production 
toward developing countries has widely involved the exploitation of later- 
ite deposits, despite its persistence over the last t h r ty  years t h s  shift 
may not continue during the 1980s and 1890s. ' 
Industry investment plans provide a possible check on the reason- 
ableness of projecting past trends into the near future. Mqor new mines 
take several years to develop, and plans to invest in such projects are 
typically announced 4 to 7 years before they come into operation. Infor- 
mation on the expansion of existing mines, and on the closure of 
operating mines, is also available. Carefully compiling such information, 
one can estimate mine capacity into the future and determine whether 
the distribution of that capacity is consistent with projections based on 
past trends. At best, however, t h s  approach can provide a picture of the 
industry five years into the future. Moreover, the clarity of this picture is 
dimmed by possible changes in announced plans that may subse.quently 
occur in response to short-term market fluctuations and other considera- 
tions. 
Consequently, in assessing shifts in mining location ten to forty years 
in the future, one is ultimately forced to identify the major determinants 
of comparative advantage in mining (where comparative advantage is 
defined broadly to include the political and other factors affecting future 
investment and production decisions) and assess how these determinants 
are changing over time. Over the last two centuries, international trade 
economists have developed a number of interesting theories for explain- 
ing shifts in comparative advantage. For resource trade, the factor 
endowment theory is usually considered the most relevant. Indeed, it 
almost seems self-evident that Zaire is a major producer of cobalt 
because it is well-endowed with cobalt, or that Canada is a major pro- 
ducer of nickel because it is well-endowed with nickel. Yet exactly how to 
define and measure a country's endowment of cobalt and nickel is not 
clear. In addition, it is well-known that political instability, fear of 
expropriation, availability of infrastructure, and other considerations also 
influence where mining firms invest and produce minerals. 
Despite such caveats, recent research (Tilton, forthcoming) on 
copper, nickel, and a few other mineral commodities suggests that a sig- 
nificant, though far from perfect, relationshp exists between the mine 
output of major producing countries and their reserves2 ten years ear- 
lier. This suggests that the reserve data shown in Tables 2a-d for 1980 
can provide some insights into likely shifts in mining over the coming 
decade. 
For cobalt, these figures raise the possibility that the recent down- 
ward trend in the developing countries' share of world output may be 
reversed in the future. More specifically, they suggest that the relative 
output of Zaire will continue to decline, but that production in the Philip- 
pihes, Zambia, and other countries will more than offset the relative 
decline of Zaire. In contrast, the reserves found in developed countries 
are significantly less than the latter's share of world production. For 
several reasons, however, considerable caution must be exercised in 
assessing the implications of the reserve data for cobalt. First, the con- 
suming countries generally consider cobalt a critical and strategic 
mineral, and twice during the 1970s supplies from Zaire were interrupted 
due to civil strife. As a result, the consuming countries may prefer to 
purchase their supplies in more stable, developed countries, even though 
they may be less well-endowed in terms of reserves than developing coun- 
tries. Second, outside of Zaire cobalt is widely produced as a by-product 
of nickel and copper. Measuring reserves in such situations is much more 
'~eserves indicate the quantity of a mineral commodity found in known (discovered) depo- 
sits that are economic to exploit given existing mineral prices and production costs. They 
are one of several possible measures of mineral endowment, and tend to change over time in 
response to exploration a d  the discovery of new deposits, changes in mineral prices, and 
ahifts in production costs. 
difficult, and the resulting estimates less reliable 
The geographic distribution of copper reserves suggests that the pro- 
duction of t h s  commodity may shf t  somewhat during the 1980s toward 
the developing countries and away from the socialist countries. About 
one third of world production and reserves are found in the developed 
market economy countries, and so little change in their future market 
share is expected. 
While the developing countries mined 26% of world manganese pro- 
duction in 1980, they held only 7% of total reserves. So the declining 
market share of these countries over the last several decades may well 
continue in the future. According to Table 2c, manganese reserves are 
highly concentrated in two areas--the Soviet Union with 45% of the world 
total, and South Africa with 41%. As these two countries produced only 
38% and 21% of world output in 1980, their share of world production 
could increase in the future. However, the major consuming countries 
may resist becoming overly dependent on these two countries. To the 
extent this is the case, developing countries and other producers with 
more modest reserves will have an opportunity to supply more of the 
world's output than would otherwise be the case. 
In contrast to manganese, the reserve figures for nickel imply that 
an increasing proportion of world output will come from the developing 
countries. Possessing 63% of world reserves, they accounted for only 34% 
of mine production in 1980. The developed market economy countries 
and the socialist countries on the other hand produced more than 
expected on the basis of their reserves. Here again, the implied shifts 
may be inhibited or retarded by other considerations. In particular, as 
noted above, nickel is extracted from two quite different types of mineral 
ores--sulfide deposits and laterite deposits. In general, the former are 
more profitable to mine, as they enjoy more valuable by-product 
recovery, higher recovery rates, and lower processing costs. This last 
advantage, which derives in large part from the fact that sulfide ores can 
be concentrated by mechanical means and so require less energy for 
treatment, has increased in recent years with the rise in energy prices. 
As a result, the shift of nickel production toward the developing countries 
may be impeded, for these countries possess some 86% of the world's 
nickel reserves in laterite deposits, but only 6% of those in sulfide depo- 
sits. 
Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
According to welfare theory, the changes caused by trade in a 
country's consumer and producer surpluses reflect the costs and benefits 
it derives from trade. These changes are illustrated in Figure l a  for an 
importing country. The curve Dd is the country's domestic demand 
curve, the curve Sd is its domestic supply curve, and the curve S, its sup- 
ply curve for imports. (If the country purchased only a small portion of 
total world exports, and hence had no impact on the world price, the 
curve S, would be horizontal rather than upward-sloping). 
In the absence of trade, the country would produce and consume the 
quantity Q1 of the mineral commodity in question at a market clearing 
price of PI. Consumer surplus, defined as the difference between what 
consumers are willing to pay and what they actually have to pay, is given 
by the area abP1. Producer surplus, defined as the difference between 
Price 
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the revenues received by producers and their costs, is given by the area 
P,bd, assuming that the domestic supply curve Sd reflects the marginal 
costs of domestic production. 
With trade, the country resorts to imports to satisfy domestic 
demand, as imports are available at lower prices than domestic produc- 
tion. Indeed, according to Flgure la ,  domestic suppliers cease produc- 
tion at the new equilibrium price P2, and domestic demand Q2 is entirely 
satisfied by import. (This need not be the case, of course. Some domes- 
tic producers may remain competitive even at the lower market clearing 
price that occurs with trade, and Figure l a  could easily be adjusted to 
reflect such a situation.) Figure 1. Changes in Consumer and Producer 
Surpluses Due to Trade. 
In any case, trade adversely affects domestic producers by reducing, 
and in this case eliminating, the producers surplus earned by domestic 
firms. Consumers on the other hand benefit from trade, as the consumer 
surplus increases by the area PlbcP2. The net benefit--the difference 
between the gain in consumer surplus and the loss of producer surplus--is 
thus given by the area dbcPz. 
Figure l b  shows the benefits from trade for an exporting country. 
The curve Dd is the country's domestic demand curve, the curve Sd its 
domestic supply curve, and the curve D, its export demand curve. 
Without trade, domestic supply and demand are equal a t  the quantity Q1 
and the market clearing price PI .  Trade raises domestic supply to Q2 and 
price to P2. At the latter price, domestic demand is reduced, and in the 
case illustrated in Flgure l b  completely eliminated, causing a decline in 
consumer surplus. Producer surplus, however, increases substantially, 
and the net gain to the country from trade is given by the area P2abc. 
The preceding suggests that all one needs to appraise the benefits of 
trade is a set of supply and demand curves similar to those shown in Fig- 
ure 1 for the significant importing and exporting countries. One can then 
derive the benefits for each country, and through simple addition calcu- 
late the total benefits from trade for all exporting countries, for all 
developing countries, or for any other subset of countries. Assessing 
shifts in benefits among countries over time requires only that the supply 
and demand be estimated for the future period of interest. 
Unfortunately, in practice a number of difficulties, both conceptual 
and empirical, make it extremely difficult to assess with much accuracy 
the benefits of ttade. 
First, it is far easier to draw a hypothetical set of supply and demand 
curves, as in Figure 1, than actually to determine these curves for 
specific countries. Econometric studies at best provide a reliable picture 
of the nature of these curves and their elasticities around the range of 
prices and outputs that have actually occurred in the past. They cannot 
estimate the domestic supply curve for an importing country that has 
had no domestic production, or the demand curve for a producing coun- 
try that had no domestic consumption. Nor can they provide much infor- 
mation about the nature of the demand curve in importing countries at 
prices that are five or ten times greater than those ever realized. Yet 
such information is essential for assessing the consumer surplus of these 
countries. 
Second, supply curves for both importing and exporting countries 
may not reflect the incremental or marginal costs of production. In par- 
ticular, large producers with market power have an incentive to limit 
their output so that price is maintained above their marginal cost. As a 
result, the area between the supply curve and the market price underes- 
timates the producer surplus they enjoy. 
Third, even where the supply curve faithfully reflects the costs firms 
incur, these private costs may deviate from the social costs borne by the 
country as a whole. For instance, the cost of labor to firms in developing 
countries suffering from high unemployment or underemployment may 
be far above the true social costs measured in terms of the value of the 
products or services that must be given up because that labor is not 
available for other purposes. Similarly, an overvalued currency may 
result in artificially high costs for domestic inputs. Where such 
discrepancies exist between social and private costs, the domestic supply 
curve should be adjusted to reflect the former when appraising the pro- 
ducer surplus realized by the country as a whole. 
Fourth, the costs and benefits of trade are assessed within a partial, 
rather than general, equilibrium framework. Consequently, the impact of 
mineral trade on other sectors of the economy is ignored. Canada and 
other producing countries have a t  times expressed concern that their 
mineral exports keep the value of their domestic currencies relatively 
hgh ,  and in the process inhibit balanced economic development by 
impeding the growth of their manufacturing and service sectors. 
Finally, trade may redistribute income and wealth withn a country, 
accentuating or alleviating disparities. In addition, the government may, 
through taxes and other means, capture some of the surpluses accruing 
to producers and consumers. Whether these funds are spent on educa- 
tion, military hardware, economic diversification, or social security 
greatly affects the ultimate benefits derived from trade. Again, such con- 
siderations are ignored when the benefits of trade are assessed simply in 
terms of the impact on consumer and producer surpluses. 
These problems have encouraged some researchers to fall back on 
trends in prices or producer revenues to appraise how the benefits of 
mineral trade are shifting over time between consumers and producers. 
For example, the secular decline in real manganese prices, noted earlier, 
is often cited as evidence of a shift of benefits from producers to consu- 
mers. Yet a little consideration clearly indicates that this is not neces- 
sarily a valid conclusion. If the decline in prices is the result of a down- 
ward shift over time in the world demand curve, both the consumer and 
producer surpluses have declined. In the process, the proportion of total 
benefits going to producers could have decreased or increased. The dec- 
lining price, however, has more likely been the result of a downward shlft 
in the world supply curve caused by major advances in earth-moving 
capabilities and other technological developments along with the opening 
up of large, low-cost deposits over time. So while prices have declined, so 
have production costs. Whether on balance producers have received a 
larger or smaller surplus, and whether this surplus constitutes more or 
less of the total benefits generated by trade, is not known. 
What is clear, however, is that such changes tend to redistribute the 
available producer surplus. Traditional producers whose costs do not 
decline as much as the price falls find their benefits diminishing, whle 
others enjoy greater returns from trade. The adjustments forced on the 
former can be quite painful, particularly if these countries derive a sub- 
stantial share of their government revenues and foreign exchange earn- 
ings from mineral trade. They understandably are likely to complain that 
prices are not "remunerative and just" for producers, even when the 
surplus realized by all producers has actually increased. 
Producer revenues, which can easily be derived by multiplying the 
average price a country receives for a mineral product times its output 
or shipments, are also on occasions used as a measure of the benefits 
from trade. In addition to the ready availability of the necessary informa- 
tion, t h s  procedure is justified on the grounds that private costs often 
exceed the social costs of mineral production in developing countries. 
Furthermore, developing countries generally attach great importance to 
the acquisition of foreign exchange, and where output is largely or 
entirely exported, producer revenues approximate the foreign exchange 
a country earns from its output. 
Nevertheless, producer revenues suffer from several serious defects 
as a measure of the benefits that even developing countries derive from 
mineral trade. In particular, certain inputs used in mining and process- 
ing minerals, such as capital, technology under license, and expatriate 
labor, are likely to come from abroad and so require forelgn exchange to 
acquire. As Mikesell (1975) and others have pointed out, such costs 
should be subtracted from producer revenues to obtain the net forelgn 
exchange earnings or retained value of mineral production. Even after 
making this adjustment, the remainder reflects the benefits of trade to 
the host country only if all the domestic resources used in mining and 
processing have no social value in the sense that they could not be used 
elsewhere in the economy. While such an assumption may at times 
appear plausible for unshlled labor, for other domestic inputs, such as 
skilled labor, management, materials, and producer goods, it seems most 
implausible. 
Unfortunately, there are no easy shortcuts or convenient rules of 
thumb for measuring the benefits of trade. Trends in prices, producer 
revenues, and even retained value, though used on occasion for this pur- 
pose, can be misleading. To appraise the benefits of mineral trade, one is 
forced to assess consumer and producer surpluses. This, in turn, 
requires information on the price that consumers pay and that producers 
receive, on the production cost of producers, and on the prices that con- 
sumers would be willing to pay if necessary. 
Reliable estimates of what consumers are prepared if necessary to 
pay are particularly difficult to obtain. In part, this is because the 
number of end uses is quite high for most minerals, making it impractical 
to assess the marginal benefit of the commodity to each. Moreover, since 
the introduction of seabed mining and its resulting impacts are likely to 
occur gradually over a number of years, the dormat ion  needed is not 
how much a particular user would pay over the next month or even year if 
necessary, but rather how much he would demand at  various prices after 
he had ample time to install the necessary equipment and to develop new 
technologies for substituting alternative materials or for conserving the 
material in question. In other words, the information needed pertains to 
the shape and nature of the long-run rather than short-run demand 
curve. As this curve is affected by price-induced technological change 
and as the timing and impact of technological change are inherently diffi- 
cult to anticipate, it is not easy to obtain reliable estimates of the long- 
run supply curve, and hence of consumer surplus. While this is particu- 
larly true for supply curves 10 or 40 years in the future, it is also the case 
for curves that pertain to the present. 
If one is primarily interested in the benefits of mineral trade for pro- 
ducers, insights into the evolution of these benefits over time can be 
obtained from information on prices and production costs. Here the 
prospects of obtaining the necessary information appear somewhat more 
promising. On the basis of grade of ore, size of deposit, and other con- 
siderations, mineral producing firms, consulting organizations, and gov- 
ernment agencies have estimated the production costs associated with 
both operating and potential mines.3 This information can be used to 
approximate a long-run marginal cost curve for the industry, which if the 
latter is competitive corresponds to the long-run supply curve. 
Such a curve is illustrated in Flgure 2 for copper. Production costs 
per pound are shown on the vertical axis and annual output at  designated 
capacities on the horizontal axis. The lowest cost mine, indicated by I, 
has average production costs (including a normal rate of profit) of OC1 
and an annual output of OQ1. The second lowest cost mine, identified as 
'1n most cases, this information is proprietary and not readily available. However, the U.S. 
Bureau of Mines hes been accumulating such cost information for its Minerals Availability 
System, and has actually constructed cost curves for operat- copper mines in the United 
States Birnilar to the curve shown in Figure 2 (Davidoff 1980). 
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11, has average costs of OCz and output of QIQ2. Ths figure shows the 
costs and output for a number of other mines, and in actually construct- 
ing such a figure one would want to include all existing and potential 
mines. The production cost for mines that recover by-products and co- 
products should be net of the credits these products produce. Where the 
product itself is a by-product, as is the case for most cobalt production 
outside Zaire, only those costs should be counted that occur after separa- 
tion from the main product has taken place. 4 
Figure 2 shows production costs rising rather sharply initially and 
then leveling off at  about 1.50 dollars per pound of copper. On the basis 
of available evidence, this is probably a reasonable assumption, as a 
number of large porphyry copper deposits become economical at  about 
that price. This tendency for the long-run supply curve to become hor- 
izontal at larger output levels may be true for cobalt, manganese, and 
nickel as well. If so, and if demand is sufficient to require production 
from at least some of the relatively high-cost deposits, then cost curves 
similar to those illustrated in Figure 2 provide information on both pro- 
duction costs at  different mines (and hence in different producing coun- 
tries) and the approximate long-term market clearmg price. Ths,  it will 
be recalled, is all that is needed to assess producer surplus for individual 
countries or for groups of countries. 
Estimating the overall magnitude and geographic distribution of pro- 
ducer surplus in the future, even on the assumption of no seabed mining, 
is somewhat more difficult. Over time, production costs are likely to rise 
4 ~ o r  an interesting conceptual discussion regarding the long-run supply curve for mineral 
commodities produced as by-products, see Brooks (1885). 
or fall with changes in technology, real labor costs, capital equipment 
costs, and other factors. These changes, however, may not create the 
obstacles that one might first imagine. This is because producer surplus 
is not affected by parallel shifts, either upward or downward in the long- 
run cost curve, but only by changes in its internal shape. In this connec- 
tion, what is particularly important is the size and number of mines 
operating with cost below the market price, and the extent to whch their 
costs rise or fall over time relative to that price. Such changes may 
occur for two reasons. First, the cost differential between marginal and 
intramarginal mines may widen or narrow. For instance, the differential 
may be reduced by the shutting down over time of a number of low-cost 
mines as their ore bodies are depleted. Alternatively, the cost advantage 
of low-cost mines may be enhanced by an increase in energy prices, as 
appears to be the case for sulfide deposits in the nickel industry. Second, 
if one or several dominant producers exercise market power and as a 
result a differential exists between the market price and the cost of mar- 
ginal producers, any change over time in this differential will affect the 
surplus realized by producers. A shift towards a more competitive 
market structure, for example, would diminish it. 
While it is not possible to anticipate such changes with great preci- 
sion, a careful examination of trends in market structure, prices of factor 
inputs, production technology, and other relevant factors can provide 
some inslghts into how producer surplus is likely to evolve, both in terms 
of its overall magnitude and its distribution among countries. 
MPACXS OF SEABED MINING 
This section examines the possible impacts of seabed mining over 
the next forty years. The focus again is on the production costs and 
prices of the mineral commodities contained in seabed nodules, the loca- 
tion of mining, and the benefits from mineral production and trade. 
Prices and Production Costs 
. Seabed mining is unlikely to  raise the production costs or prices of 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel above what they otherwise would 
be, for if it were actually more expensive than the output from marginal 
land-based producers, there would be no economic incentive to engage in 
seabed production. Aside from t h s  constraint, however, the range of pos- 
sible impacts on costs and prices is quite wide. 
A t  one extreme, seabed mining could have little or no impact. This 
would be the case, for example, if seabed mining proved uneconomical or 
for other reasons was not undertaken on a commercial scale. In addition, 
given the mineral composition of seabed nodules, limited commercial 
production is unlikely to  have much impact on copper production costs 
and prices, simply because the quantities produced would constitute such 
a small proportion of total world output. Seabed mining may also have a 
neghgible impact on manganese costs and prices, even with substantial 
commercial seabed mining, if the most attractive production technology 
excludes the recovery of manganese. 
A second possibility is that real production costs and prices will rise 
but a t  a slower rate than otherwise as a consequence of seabed mining. 
The depletion of low-cost mines forces society over time to rely on poorer 
quality deposits. Ths,  in turn, tends to shift the long-run supply curve for 
minerals outward. As this shft  occurs, seabed mining may offer an 
attractive alternative to the development of hgh-cost land-based depo- 
sits, and in the process help relieve, though not eliminate, the upward 
pressure on costs and prices. 
Finally, seabed mining could conceivably result in lower real mineral 
prices. This possibility has on occasion been denied, on the grounds that 
if seabed mining could produce mineral commodities at costs below those 
5 of land-based producers, it would already be a reality. This static argu- 
ment, however, fails to take account of the dynamic effects of technologi- 
cal change over time. Scientific developments have greatly enhanced the 
prospects for the economic recovery of minerals from seabed nodules 
over the last twenty years, and such developments are likely to continue 
in the future. Moreover, once the commercial production of seabed 
nodules is actually underway, costs are likely to fall as experience and 
learning accumulate. Consequently, the production costs of seabed min- 
ing may decline over time relative to both the current and future costs of 
land-based operations. Such a possibility is illustrated in Figure 3, which 
shows seabed mining costs falling below those of marginal land-based pro- 
ducers over time, even though the latter are declining as a result of the 
cost reducing effects of new technology and other factors. 
Furthermore, even if one excludes the possibility that such dynamic 
considerations may make seabed mining more profitable and attractive 
relative to land-based production over time, the real price of cobalt, and 
'see, for example, Ontario, Ontario Mineral Resources Branch (1880). 
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possibly, manganese, could decline as a result of seabed mining. Ths is 
because the cobalt and manganese contained in nodules could satisfy a 
significant share of total world demand even at rather modest rates of 
seabed production. As price starts to drop, the critical question would 
then be whether land-based or seabed producers would cease mining 
cobalt and manganese and thereby keep prices from dropping greatly. 
Although the economic and technological factors determining the answer 
to this question are not totally clear, most of the consortia preparing to 
engage in seabed production are not planning to produce manganese. 
Apparently they do not expect the future market price to cover the incre- 
mental costs of recovering manganese following the separation of copper, 
cobalt, and nickel from the ore. In contrast, current plans call for the 
production of cobalt, as the incremental processing costs are presumed. 
to be below expected future prices. So cobalt prices could decline in real 
terms, even if seabed mining as a whole is economical only under rising 
real prices on average for the minerals it produces. 
So far the discussion has assumed that prices follow or parallel shifts 
in the costs of marginal producers caused by seabed mining. This is a rea- 
sonable assumption over the long run for competitive industries, such as 
copper and manganese. With nickel and cobalt, where one or a few pro- 
ducers have in the past tended to dominate production and set a pro- 
ducer price, seabed mining by providing a new source of supply should 
promote more competition and reduce the market power of the major 
traditional producers. Thls, in turn, would encourage the long-run price 
to move toward, and eventually approximate, the long-run costs of margi- 
nal producers, whether they are high-cost land-based producers or 
seabed miners. In this case, real mineral prices could fall in response to 
seabed mining, even though production costs might be increasing. As 
pointed out earlier, however, the nickel and cobalt markets have in 
recent years experienced a considerable increase in competitive condi- 
tions, and as a consequence a significant discrepancy between long-run 
prices and marginal production costs may no longer exist. 
Location of Mining 
In examining the impacts of seabed mineral production on the loca- 
tion of mining, it is convenient to begin by assuming the cheapest depo- 
sits will be developed first, regardless of their location, and then to relax 
this assumption. It is also useful to differentiate, as  in the previous sec- 
tion, between three possible situations: in the first, seabed mining has no 
impact on mineral prices; in the second, prices rise but less than in the 
absence of seabed mining; and in the third, prices actually fall due to 
seabed production. 
The first situation should have little or no influence on the location of 
mining activity. Seabed production either does not occur, or takes place 
on such a modest scale that the mineral market of interest is unaffected. 
With the second situation, where real prices rise but more slowly 
than in the absence of seabed mining, existing land-based mines continue 
to be profitable and remain in operation until their reserves are depleted. 
Their productive lives, however, may be shortened, for additions to their 
reserves will occur more gradually over time due to the slower rise in 
price. In addition, the development of new land-based deposits will occur 
at  a more modest pace, as the decline in the rate of increase in price will 
dampen the incentives to conduct exploration and hence retard the 
discovery of new land-based deposits. It will also slow the shift of known 
deposits from submarginal to marginal status. As a result, mining will 
shift away from the land and toward the sea. 
The t h r d  ~ossible  situation, where real prices actually fall, could 
force the closure of operating lana-based mines even though the latter 
still contain substantial quantities of minerals that would be profitable to 
exploit at previous prices. The likelihood of such closures, however, is 
reduced by the high capital costs required to develop most land-based 
mines. Since these costs are sunk and cannot be recovered when the 
mine shuts down, the decision to stop production becomes economical 
only if price drops below the out-of-pocket or variable costs of produc- 
tion. Still, the tendency toward earlier exhaustion, identified in the previ- 
ous situation, is accentuated. Moreover, unless exploration uncovers new 
deposits with costs below those of the existing marginal land-based pro- 
ducers, all new mine development will take place a t  sea. 
The impact of the shift from land to sea production that occurs 
under the last two situations on the output of particular producing coun- 
tries or groups of countries depends on their relative production costs. 
Countries with undeveloped deposits that are just marginal will suffer the 
most, in that the development of these deposits either will occur more 
slowly or not at  all. The large undeveloped porphyry copper deposits in 
Chile and Peru, for example, fall into t h s  category. If seabed mining 
causes prices actually to fall, it will again be the marginal land producers 
that are most adversely affected, but in this situation both operating as 
well as potential mines could suffer. In nickel, for example, the high-cost 
laterite deposits found mostly in the developing countries are likely to 
bear the brunt of any curtailment in land production, whle output from 
the relatively low-cost sulfide deposits found in Canada and other 
developed countries would be little affected. 
If one now relaxes the assumption that known deposits are exploited 
over time in order of their relative production costs, it is clear that other 
considerations may also affect the future location of mining. The govern- 
ments of the major industrialized countries, for instance, may be 
prepared to subsidize seabed production, should it prove somewhat more 
expensive than land-based mining, to diversify their sources of supply and 
reduce their vulnerability to import interruptions. Conversely, if seabed 
mining proves a serious threat to land-based producers, host govern- 
ments may protect and subsidize the latter, rather than accept the social 
dislocation and other costs associated with domestic mine closure. If fol- 
lowed by a number of countries, such behavior could precipitate a sub- 
stantial decline in mineral prices, and leave large segments of the land- 
based mining industry unprofitable. While the extent to which political 
decisions are likely to override the underlying economic determinants of 
mining location is difficult to predict, clearly such decisions could have a 
major influence on the geographic distribution of mining activity in the 
future. 
Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
The global costs and benefits associated with the seabed mining of 
nickel are depicted conceptually in Figure 4. Similar figures could be 
constructed for cobalt, copper, and manganese. 
The curve D in Figure 4 reflects the long-run world demand curve for 
nickel at the time under consideration. The curve SL is the long-run sup- 
ply curve for land-based producers. Assuming the industry is relatively 
competitive, the latter is approximated by a smoothed version of a step 
cost curve similar to that shown in Figure 2 for copper. In the absence of 
seabed mining, the quantity Q1 is produced and consumed at  the market 
clearing price PI. 
Now, if production from seabed sources is Limited to a fixed quantity, 
and if seabed production costs over t h s  permissible range are constant 
at  CS and lower than those of marginal land-based producers, the total 
supply curve for nickel from both land- and sea-based deposits can be 
drawn as ST in Flgure 4. This curve coincides with the supply curve for 
land-based producers at  low prices, and then shifts to the right at  a price 
equal to CS by the amount of allowable seabed production. At higher 
prices, the total supply curve lies to the right of the supply curve of land- 
based producers by an amount equal to the ceiling on seabed produc- 
tion. 6 
'~0th the assumption of fixed costs over the relevant range of seabed production and the a 4  
sumption of a fined ceiling on seabed production could be relaxed. This would require a 
moditicetion of Figure 4, which would complicate the exposition, but not change the basic 
conclusions regarding the distribution of the costs and benefits of seabed mining. 
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With the addition to total supply from seabed mining, Figure 4 shows 
the equilibrium price drops to P2. At t h s  lower price, world demand 
increases to QzT. Seabed production is just sufficient to provide for this 
increase in demand and to make up for the reduction in land-based pro- 
duction from Q1 to QZL. 
The fall in market price coupled with the decline in land-based out- 
put causes the producer surplus to diminish by the amount represented 
in Figure 4 by the area PlacP2. World consumers, on the other hand, 
enjoy an increase in their surplus equal to the area PlabP2, whch 
exceeds the loss of land-based producers by the amount abc. In addition, 
a surplus equal to the rectangle cbed is realized by seabed producers, so 
the net global benefit is abedc. Some of the producer surplus earned by 
seabed miners can, of course, be taxed and redistributed to other par- 
ties. 
It is interesting to note that the welfare costs of seabed mining are 
borne by the land-based producers, and that this loss is greatest per unit 
of output for the relatively low-cost producers that remain in business 
after seabed mining is underway. The hgher cost land-based producers 
that are either kept out or pushed out of the industry by seabed produc- 
tion have smaller surpluses or rents, which they would otherwise have 
realized, and so lose less. 
The increase in consumer surplus caused by seabed mining is 
enjoyed by all consuming countries. Since even the land-based producing 
countries are consumers, some of their producer loss is offset by consu- 
mer gains. Yet, as is well known, the largest consumers are the major 
industrialized countries--the United States, Japan, and member states of 
the EEC and CMEA--and it is these countries that potentially have the 
most to gain. However, as Figure 4 suggests, the amount by which the 
consumer surplus increases and hence the benefits flowing to the indus- 
trialized countries can be curtailed by limiting the amount of mineral 
production permitted from the seabed. The smaller this limit, the less 
price will decline and consumer surplus will increase. 
The second surplus produced by seabed mining goes initially to those 
firms and consortia engaged in this activity. Although these producers 
are likely to come primarily from the major industrialized countries, as 
noted earlier, much of this surplus can be captured through royalties and 
other means, and redistributed to developing countries, adversely 
affected land-based producers, or other groups. 
This discussion of the costs and benefits associated with seabed min- 
ing rests on certain assumptions that should be noted explicitly. In par- 
ticular, the supply curve for land-based producers SL is presumed to 
reflect the social as well as private costs of production. If this is not the 
case, and if one is interested ultimately in the costs and benefits of 
seabed mining for society in general, rather than private producers, this 
curve should be modified to take account of such discrepancies before 
the shifts in producer and consumer surpluses are measured. In addi- 
tion, and of much greater importance, the analysis has implicitly 
assumed that seabed mining is or will soon be competitive with land- 
based production. Ths is far from certain. If seabed mining does not 
take place within the foreseeable future, none of the shifts in costs or 
benefits attributed to  this activity will occur. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR F'URl3HER RESEARCH 
The possible impact of seabed mining has been examined in three 
specific areas--prices and production costs, location of mining activity, 
and the magnitude and geographc distribution of the benefits from 
mineral production and trade. The analysis has been largely conceptual 
in nature, with little or no attempt actually to quantify anticipated 
impacts. Despite this fairly narrow scope, two general conclusions 
emerge: 
1. Measuring the future impacts of seabed mining is an extremely 
complicated and difficult endeavor. To begin with, forecasting mineral 
markets ten to forty years into the future, even in the absence of seabed 
mining, is fraught with difficulties. Of course, certain trends can be dis- 
cerned and projected into the future. Mineral markets in general are 
becoming more competitive over time as the number of major producing 
firms and countries increase. Production is shifting from the developed 
to the developing countries for some mineral commodities, and from the 
developing to the developed countries for others. Long-run secular 
trends in rkal prices can also be identified. They are down for some 
minerals, constant for others, and up for still others. While some of these 
past trends are likely to continue into the future, others will be reversed 
by hgher  energy prices, new technologies, or other developments. Fore- 
casting which trends wil l  continue and which will not is a hazardous busi- 
ness, where at  best only partial success can be expected. 
Even if such trends in mineral markets could be reasonably 
predicted, the actual amount of seabed mining that will take place over 
the next forty years is unknown. The relative costs of seabed and land- 
based production are the subject of much discussion and disagreement. 
How scientific breakthroughs and other technological developments will 
alter future costs is simply unknown, and to some extent unknowable. 
Moreover, relative costs alone will not be the only determinant of the 
future level of seabed mining. Industrialized countries may support such 
production to lessen their dependence on foreign producers. Distressed 
land-based producers may receive assistance from their own govern- 
ments, and protection in the form of constraints on seabed production 
negotiated through international agreements. In the end, seabed produc- 
tion may be influenced as much by such political decisions as economic 
considerations. Anticipating the future course of the important political 
decisions is not easy. 
Finally, even if the future level of seabed mining could be ascer- 
tained, its impacts would still be difficult to assess ex ante. Such assess- 
ments may require knowledge about segments of the long-run supply and 
demand curves far from the observed price and output equilibria of the 
past. This limits the use of econometric and other quantitative tech- 
niques. Nor is it clear how these curves will shift over the next several 
decades in response to resource depletion, technological progress, the 
introduction of new materials, changes in the mineral policies (perhaps in 
response to the perceived threat of seabed production), and other fac- 
tors. 
2. The potential impacts of seabed mining appear to vary over a 
wider range and to be less bounded than often presumed. For example, 
the first commercial mining of seabed nodules is widely anticipated to 
take place sometime during the 1990s, and several consortia are 
expected to be in operation by the end of the century. Yet the necessary 
technology, particularly on the scale required, has not yet been proven. 
Nor is it completely clear that the requisite public policies to protect the 
needed private investment are in place. These uncertainties raise the 
possibility that seabed mining could suffer a fate similar to that of oil 
shale, where for years commercial production has appeared imminent 
and yet this goal seems as elusive today as twenty years ago. 
On the other hand, the maximum impact that seabed mining could 
have is at  times not fully appreciated. This is clearly illustrated by the 
argument that seabed mining could not force existing land-based mines 
to close. As pointed out earlier, the rationale for this position overlooks 
the potential influence of new technology and learning by doing, on the 
relative costs of seabed and land-based mining. It also ignores the copro- 
duct nature of seabed production, and the substantial effect of even lirn- 
ited production on the cobalt and perhaps manganese markets. 
In short, the development of new and unconventional technologies 
involves dealing with the unknown and entails great uncertainty. This is 
particularly true for seabed mining, as the extent of its success ulti- 
mately will depend not only on economic and technological considerations 
but also on political developments. As all of these factors are difficult to 
predict and potentially erratic in their behavior, the impacts of seabed 
mining over the next forty years on the welfare of land-based producers, 
consumers, and other groups range over an extremely broad spectrum, 
from negligible to overwhelming. 
These general conclusions--that seabed mining could conceivably 
have rather dramatic impacts, but that determining whether this will 
actually be the case is extremely difficult--are not terribly comforting for 
those whose future welfare could be substantially altered by seabed min- 
ing. This raises the question, how might future research on this issue 
cope with the inherent complexities and narrow the range of possible out- 
comes, so that appropriate policies might be undertaken to promote the 
beneficial effects of seabed mining while alleviating the adverse conse- 
quences? In considering this question, two distinct lines of research, 
which could be carried out separately, appear worth pursuing. 
The first and probably most difficult would focus on the expected 
evolution of mineral production from seabed nodules over the next forty 
years. At the earliest, when might seabed mining begin? What are the 
best point estimates of seabed production for 1995, 2000, 2010, and 2020? 
Can a confidence interval be calculated for each of these estimates? Ths 
effort would entail a continuation and extension of the work by Nyhart et  
al. (1978), Diederich et  al. (1979), and Charles River Associates (1981) on 
the costs of seabed mining. The expected impact of technological pro- 
gress and learning by dolng on future costs would have to be assessed, 
and the findings compared with those of marginal land-based producers. 
The conclusions regarding the potential profitability of seabed mining 
would then have to  be adjusted for possible subsidies or constraints 
resulting from political decisions. 
While the probability of identifying all of the important factors that 
will ultimately determine the future level of seabed mining and their 
future impact on t h s  activity is not hgh ,  the level of seabed production 
will clearly be one of the major, if not the major determinant of the even- 
tual impact of this activity on land-based producers and consumers. 
The second line of research would assess the expected impacts of 
seabed mining on the assumption that production from this source grows 
over time in a given manner. In light of the inherent difficulties of actu- 
ally forecasting seabed output, various growth patterns could be specified 
and their impacts assessed. Here too there is some literature, in large 
part the work of ~ d a r n s . ~  that such an inquiry could build on and extend. 
What essentially is required is a better understanding of the long-run 
demand curves for cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel, and of the 
long-run supply curves from land-based production for these commodi- 
ties. Not only is a better picture needed of these curves as they exist 
today, but also of how they are likely to evolve in the future. Econometric 
models and other quantitative techniques can provide some of the infor- 
mation needed. In particular, if properly specified, they can document 
the nature of the current supply and demand functions over the range of 
recent outputs and prices. Other techniques can then supplement t h s  
information to trace out other parts of the current curves, and to 
appraise their likely shifts over time. 
In the case of cobalt, for example, more information is needed on its 
various actual and potential end uses and on its production costs. Should 
the price of cobalt approach that of nickel, in what uses and to what 
extent would it be substituted for nickel? How large are these potential 
'~n the early 1970s,   dams conducted a number of econometric studies on the impacts of 
seabed mining for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. For a list of 
these and other studies, see references cited in Adams (1980). 
cobalt markets now? How large are they likely to be in the future? How 
will the development of new composites, plastics, ceramics, and other 
materials, along with improved processing techniques enhancing the pro- 
perties of steel and other traditional materials, affect the future demand 
for cobalt? To what extent has the recent instability in the cobalt market 
caused by interruptions in supply from Zaire encouraged re search and 
development activity that will ultimately reduce the long-run demand for 
cobalt? To what extent has this instability also shifted investment and in 
turn the future location of mining away from central Africa? How do pro- 
duction costs vary among the land-based producers, both for those min- 
ing cobalt as a main product and for those mining cobalt as a byproduct? 
How are these costs likely to shift over time? To what extent will Zaire, 
perhaps with the help of Zambia, possess the market power needed to 
control the price of cobalt over the long run? 
While no amount of research can answer such questions for certain, 
either for cobalt or for the other mineral commodities found in seabed 
nodules, a considerable amount of qualitative information is available 
from metallurgists, market analysts, mining engineers, and other special- 
ists that can be used to piece together a picture of the long-run mineral 
supply and demand curves. The challenge lies in identifying and collect- 
ing the pertinent qualitative information, integrating it with feasible 
quantitative analyses, and then analyzing and interpreting the results in 
an appropriate manner. Here judgement and skill, along with diligence, 
are essential. 
Moreover, given the qualitative components of such analysis, it must 
be recognized that no universally accepted statistical measures or 
rigorous rules exist for assessing the reliability or accuracy of the find- 
ings. Judgements regarding assumptions and interpretation must be 
made, and will inevitably be called into question. 
Such problems, however, bedevil all important and still unresolved 
issues. Otherwise, the research required would long since have been car- 
ried out. 
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APPENDIX 
SEABED MINING AND MINERAL TRADE PATTERNS 
The preceding enquiry examines recent trends and the potential 
effects of seabed mining in three areas--mineral prices and production 
costs, the location of mining, and the benefits from mineral production 
and trade. This appendix, prepared after the original study was com- 
pleted, extends that analysis by examining the possible impact of seabed 
mining on mineral trade patterns. The first section considers past trends 
in the patterns of trade for cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel; and 
the second the possible consequences of seabed mining on the future evo- 
lution of these patterns. 
Recent Trends 
A trade pattern reflects the geographic flow of a particular commo- 
dity in international trade, and is defined by a matrix whose elements 
measure the amount of trade between each exporting and importing 
country over a given period of time such as a year. For example, trade 
matrices prepared by Fischman (1980) for copper in 1976 and manganese 
in 1975, at  several stages of production, are shown in the tables accom- 
panying this appendix. Similar tables, based on the work of Hubbard 
(1975), portray the trade patterns for semiprocessed nickel in 1970 and 
refined nickel in 1972.: Comparable tables for cobalt are not available, as 
the necessary information on international trade in this commodity has 
not been collected and published. 
Historically, trade patterns have been largely ignored in the 
economic literature. This is in part because traditional international 
trade theory has focused primarily on comparative advantage and its 
underlying determinants. In the process, it has abstracted from tran- 
sportation costs and the other factors affecting the choice of tradmg 
partners. There are, of course, exceptions. Location theory and a 
number of linear programming studies, for instance, have explicitly con- 
sidered the flow of trade between particular countries. These efforts gen- 
erally assume that the desire to minimize transportation costs dictates 
the pattern of trade. 
In recent years, however, a number of studies (Dorr, 1975; Hubbard, 
1975; Santos, 1976; Whitney, 1976; Tilton, 1966; and Demler and Tilton, 
1980) have called into question the assumption that transportation costs 
constitute the only, or even the most important, determinant of trade 
flows of copper, manganese, nickel, and other mineral commodities 
(though not cobalt, as the necessary trade data are not available). These 
studies find that: 
1. International ownership ties, and the multinational mining cor- 
porations responsible for these ties, greatly shape the pattern of mineral 
trade, often in directions inconsistent with minimizing transportation 
costs. Their influence is particularly apparent for mineral commodities 
a t  early stages of production, such as the ore and concentrate stage. 
This general conclusion is found to hold for trade in blister copper, man- 
ganese ore, and semiprocessed nickel, though somewhat surprisingly, not 
for copper ore and concentrate. 
2. Political blocs, such as the British Commonwealth, the French 
Community, and the commercial, cultural, and other ties they have 
created over the years among member countries, also influence the 
structure of mineral trade. In contrast to ownershp ties, however, they 
are most important for trade in refined metal products, and have much 
less influence on trade at earlier stages of production. This general con- 
clusion holds for blister and refined copper as well as for refined nickel. 
It may be valid as well for ferromanganese and refined cobalt, though 
existing studies have not examined these particular products. 
3. The presence of a common border stimulates trade between 
neighboring countries, again primarily a t  the refined metal stage of pro- 
duction, significantly more than can be attributed to the relatively low 
transportation costs between such countries. Apparently, neighboring 
countries often share common business customs and possess other 
mutual attributes that stimulate trade between them. This particular 
determinant of trade patterns is significant for both refined copper and 
refined nickel, the two commodities found in seabed nodules whose trade 
patterns have been analyzed at  the refined metal stage of production. 
With respect to trends over time, some evidence exists to suggest 
that the influence of ownership ties has been declining. For several rea- 
sons, this finding is not particularly surprising. Over the last two 
decades, the mines and processing facilities of multinational mining com- 
panies in a number of developing countries have been nationalized, and 
are now operated by state-owned enterprises. Second, the nature of 
financing mineral ventures has changed over the last two decades. In the 
early years after World War 11, most new projects were developed and 
entirely owned by a s~ngle major multinational mining corporation. The 
1960s saw a shift towards project financing, where several firms colla- 
borate in developing new ventures. They share the equity investment, 
and borrow a large portion of the total development costs from banks and 
other lending organizations. Such financial arrangements are likely over 
time to reduce the importance of intra-firm shpments in international 
trade. Finally, the influence of Japan on trade patterns has grown as 
mineral imports into that country have increased with its rapid economic 
development. Traditionally, Japan has relied less on ownership ties and 
more on long-term contracts than other industrialized countries to insure 
its import needs. 
Focusing specifically on the four principal mineral commodities con- 
tained in seabed nodules, one finds the evidence supporting a decline in 
the importance of ownership ties more tenuous. For copper, no trend is 
discernable a t  the ore: and concentrate stage (where, as noted earlier, 
ownership ties have not been significant) or at the blister stage (where 
ownership ties have been and remain important). Only at the refined 
metal stage has the influence of ownerslvp ties waned over time (Whtney, 
1976). In nickel, such ties shaped trade patterns in the early postwar 
period at both the semiprocessed and refined metal stages of produc- 
tion, and they have continued to do so in recent years (Hubbard, 1975). 
One would also expect to find the influence of political blocs declin- 
ing, reflecting the dissolution over the last thirty years of the major polit- 
ical empires. Surprisingly, the available studies provide little or no evi- 
dence supporting this expectation. Apparently, the ties established 
during the colonial period to encourage trade among member countries 
persist long after formal political bonds are severed. Likewise, the stu- 
dies find little change over time in the importance of neighboring coun- 
tries in stimulating trade. Where this factor was significant in the past, it 
remains so today. 
For many mineral commodities, however, one important change has 
clearly occurred: the number of actual and potential trade partners 
available to both importing and exporting countries has increased. This 
development, in a number of cases, has reduced the vulnerability of coun- 
tries to an interruption in trade with any particular partner. It has taken 
place, in part, because a number of new producers have entered mineral 
production--Cuba in cobalt, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in copper, 
Gabon in manganese, and the Philippines, Dominican Republic, and 
Botswana in nickel. In addition, Japan and a number of European states 
have become important importers. In more recent years, rapid economic 
growth in some of the developing countries has made them significant 
importers as well. 
This review of the available literature on mineral trade patterns does 
not suggest a rapid decline in the influence of international ownershp 
ties, political blocs, and neighboring country effects on mineral trade pat- 
terns. Along with transportation costs, these factors are likely to shape 
the flow of mineral trade for some time into the future. In the process, 
they will continue to introduce a certain amount of rigidity into the struc- 
ture of trade. On the other hand, if the past is a reliable guide to the 
future, the number of potential trading partners for many mineral com- 
modities is likely to grow as new producers begin exporting and 
developing consuming states become important importers. 
These expectations assume that past trends--or lack of trends-- will 
continue into the future, and that no major structural change will sub- 
stantially transform the mineral industries. However, in the case of 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel, seabed mining raises the possibil- 
ity of such a structural change, and it is to the possible impacts on 
mineral trade patterns of this development that we now turn. 
The Impact of Seabed Mining 
The potential consequences of seabed mining for mineral trade pat- 
terns, as was the case for prices and production costs, the location of 
mining, and the distribution of costs and benefits, range over a wide spec- 
trum of possibilities. At one extreme, trade patterns will obviously be 
completely unaffected if no seabed mining occurs during the 1995-2020 
period. At the other extreme, trade patterns could be radically altered. 
More specifically, seabed mining, if it occurs, will introduce new 
trade flows as production begins a t  new sources of supply. This should, at  
least initially, increase the number of actual and potential tradmg 
partners for importing countries, and so continue the trend in this direc- 
tion that has characterized the last 30 years. Over the longer run, how- 
ever, seabed mining could reduce, rather than increase, the geographic 
diversity of sources of mineral supplies, if seabed mining proves less 
expensive than many land-based sources of supply. Such a development 
would concentrate mineral production a t  sea and at  a few high-quality 
land-based deposits, increasing the vulnerability of consuming countries 
to interruptions in trade from any particular source. 
In addition, seabed mining may weaken the influence of political 
blocs and neighboring country effects on trade patterns if it replaces 
land-based production, as clearly neither of these factors will shape the 
flow of trade from seabed sources. Political ties, however, could still play 
an important role, though in a different way, as some consuming coun- 
tries may be prepared to provide protected markets and in other ways to 
subsidize seabed production by their own firms or state enterprises in 
order to reduce dependence on foreign producers for needed mineral 
imports. 
The rigihties introduced into trade patterns by international owner- 
ship ties could also be strengthened by seabed mining. This is particu- 
larly likely for trade at  early stages of production--namely, in nodules--as 
each consortia planning to engage in seabed mining is expected to have 
its own land-based processing facilities to which it will ship its nodules. 
Finally, it should be noted that the impact of seabed mining on trade 
patterns may vary considerably for different mineral commodities. For 
example, several mining operations at  sea could greatly reduce the land- 
based production of cobalt, and in the process diminish the diversity of 
supply for this commodity. The same level of seabed production, by con- 
trast, would have only a modest impact on copper mining from land- 
based deposits, and so would likely enhance, rather than reduce, the geo- 
graphic diversity of sources for this commodity. Given the mineral com- 
position of nodules and .the relative size of the market for nickel, the 
impact on land-based nickel production and the consequences for its 
diversity of supply would be greater than in the case of copper, but less 
than in the case of cobalt. For manganese, seabed production even at  a 
modest level will have a substantial impact on trade patterns if this 
mineral commodity is actually recovered. However, as is well known, 
many of the consortia contemplating the mining of seabed nodules are 
not now planning to extract and market the manganese they contain. 
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Table A-2. Estimated D i s t r i b u t i o n  of World Trade i n  Unre- 
f i n e d  Copper, 197 
(percent  of t o t a l  t r ade )  
Source: Fischman (1980), Table 3-10. 
a  inc ludes  secondary b l i s t e r  copper. 
b inc ludes  Namibia (S. W. Afr ica)  . 
C Equates t o  t o t a l  expor ts  of 825,000 m e t r i c  tons .  
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Table A-4. Estimated Distribution of World Trade in Manganese 
Ore, 1975~ 
(percentages based on Mn content) b 
- Note: Detail may not add to totals, owing to rounding, 
Source: Fischman (19801, Table 3-3. 
a~epresents total imports of developed countries (87 percent of 
total world imports). 
b~ncludes ores with 10 percent or greater manganese content. 
C Equates to imports of 4,003,000 metric tons, 
Table A-5. Estimated Distribution of World Trade in Ferromanganese, 
1975a 
b (percentages based on grosslnet quantities ) 
Note: Detail nay not add to totals, owing to rounding. 
-
Sourre: Fischman (19801, Table 3-4, 
a Represents total ferromanganese trade of "developed" coun- 
tries. Includes developed countries' trade to and from "developing" 
and Eastern European countries, if applicable. 
b~verage manganese content varies only within narrow limits 
(75 to 78 percent). 
C Equates to total imports of 1,030,000 metric tons. 
Table A-6. Estimated Distribution of World Trade ih Semiprocessed Nickel, 1970~'~ 
(percent of total trade, metal content) 
Source: Hubbard (1975), Table 2. 
a Trade involving the socialist countries, including Cuba, is excluded. 
b Semiprocessed nickel, measured in terms of metal content, encompasses ore, matte, concentrate, and 
oxide. 
otherC Australia 
C 
4.7 
4.7 
C Brazil, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Finland, Burma, and Morocco may have exported semiprocessed nickel in 
1970; however, little is known about these possible trade flows except that they were very small. 
Total 
15.8 
18.4 
49.7 
9.1 
6.4 
0.6 
- 
100.0 f 
Canada 
d~his material was refined and then reexported. 
Indonesia 
5 . 5  
5.5 
U . K .  
Norway 
Japan 
France 
Canada 
Other 
Total 
e Japan imported some nickel concentrate from Australia. The amount is unknown but presumed to be small. 
New Caledonia 
45.8 
3.6 
1.7 
0.6 
------- 
51.7 
15.8 
18. 4d 
3.9 
38.1 
'~otal trade equalled 230 thousand metric tons of contained nickel. 
Table  A-7. Es t imated  D i s t r i b u t i o n  of World Trade  i n  Refined N icke l ,  197zagb  
( p e r c e n t  of t o t a l  t r a d e )  
Source:  Hubbard (1975) ,  Tab l e  9  
a  Refined n i c k e l ,  measured i n  te rms  of me ta l  c o n t e n t ,  i n c l u q e s  a l l  p r o d u c t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  f e r r o n i c k e l ,  a t  t h e  
l a s t  s t a g e  b e f o r e  i n d u s t r i a l  u s e .  
b ~ r a d e  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  i s  exc luded .  
France  
0.6 
1 . 5  
0 . 2  
0 .9  
0 . 1  
1 . 3  
1 . 0  
1 5 . 6  
Canada 
C T o t a l  t r a d e  e q u a l l e d  272,009 m e t r i c  t o n s .  
Norway 
4 .8  
2 .1  
1 . 5  
0 .6  
0 .7  
1.1 
1 .8  
0 .8  
1 .4  
14 .8  
U.S. 
Germany 
(F. R.) 
Belgium- 
Luxembourg 
Ne the r l ands  
France  
I t a l y  
U.K.  
Sweden 
Japan  
Other  
T o t a l  
U.K.  
1 . 4  
2.5 
1 . 6  
0 . 5  
2 .0  
1 .2  
1 . 3  
0 . 2  
1 .7  
12 .4  
New 
Caledonia  
3 .2  
9.8 
1 . 5  
14 .5  
31.6 
0 . 2  
0 . 1  
0.4 
3 . 1  
0 . 1  
1.1 
3.6 
40.2 
A u s t r a l i a  
0 .2  
2.2 
0 .2  
0 .2  
1 . 3  
0 . 5  
0 . 1  
4.7 
South 
A f r i c a  
1 .O 
1 . 4  
0 . 1  
0 . 1  
0 . 3  
0 . 1  
0 . 5  
0 . 3  
3 .8  
Other  
0 . 1  
0 .8  
0 . 1  
0 . 6  
0 . 4  
0 .6  
0 . 2  
0 .2  
0 . 1  
0 .4  
4  .O  
T o t a l  
42 .9  
10 .5  
2.2 
2.6 
13 .2  
4 . 3  
5 .9  
5.7 
2.2 
10 .5  
100. oC 
A - 1 6  
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